Extant theoretical work on the political resource curse implies that dependence on resource revenues should decrease autocracies' likelihood of democratizing but not necessarily affect democracies' chances of survival. Yet most previous empirical studies estimate models that are ill-suited to address this claim. We improve upon previous studies, estimating a dynamic logit model using data from 166 countries, covering the period from 1816-2006. We find that an increase in resource dependence decreases an autocracy's likelihood of being democratic over both the short-term and long-term, but has no appreciable effect on democracies' likelihood of persisting.
Introduction
Proponents of a "political resource curse" claim that revenues from natural resources such as oil and copper are positively associated with authoritarianism. 1 However, the claim that "resource wealth inhibits democratization" is ambiguous between at least two distinct claims: (1) that resource wealth decreases a country's level of democracy; (2) that resource wealth decreases a country's likelihood of being a democracy. Hence, they only investigate the first claim, overlooking the second. In addition, very few studies consider the ways in which resource revenue's effect on political institutions can be conditioned by the existing institutional context. Those that do (e.g., Ross 2012) are unable to indicate whether the effect of resource wealth in democracies differs, statistically speaking, from its effect in autocracies. 4 These oversights mitigate the ability of existing studies to speak directly to key implications of the theoretical literature on the resource curse, implications that theorists have only recently begun to elucidate (Al-Ubaydli 2012; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). As we discuss below, extant theoretical work argues that resource wealth inhibits democratization by enabling political leaders to circumvent or resist pressures that might otherwise lead to democratic reforms (see also Beblawi 1987; Dunning 2008; Morrison 2007; Ross 2001; Wantchekon 2002 ). This implies, first, that a resource rich country will be less likely to become or remain a democracy, not necessarily that it will witness (fine-grained) changes in its level of democracy. 5 Second, this implies that existing political institutions should condition the effect of resource revenues. Where institutions afford incumbent leaders wide discretion over resource revenues, incumbents are free to neglect citizens' demands and use resource revenue in ways that preempt political opposition and consolidate authoritarian rule. But resource revenues need not subvert democracy once institutions are firmly entrenched to hold leaders accountable to their citizens and empower citizens to punish leaders for any mischief.
The foregoing discussion indicates a basic mismatch between previous empirical models and extant theory. We aim to narrow this gap. We start by clarifying the implications of extant theoretical work, showing that much of this work suggests that existing domestic institutions condition the effect of resource revenues on the likelihood of democracy. We then estimate a dynamic logit model that interacts a continuous measure of resource dependence with a measure of prior institutional constraints. Following the literature, we operationalize prior institutional constraints in terms of regime type; we assume democracies have more institutional constraints than dictatorships. Our estimation technique and model specification allow us to examine whether the impact of resource dependence on regime type varies across autocracies and democracies. We find that increasing an autocratic country's resource dependence increases the likelihood of autocratic persistence (decreases the probability of democratic emergence).
However, contrary to other studies (Morrison 2009; Ross 2012; Smith 2004) , we find that effect increasing a democratic country's resource dependence has no appreciable on the probability of democratic survival. 6 Thus, in contrast with earlier empirical studies, our results indicate that a political resource curse exists for dictatorships but not for democracies. Finally, we go beyond existing empirical studies to show that increases in resource dependence have persistent and substantial cumulative effects on autocracies' likelihood of becoming democratic over the longterm, showing that the total effect of resource dependence on regime type is much larger than the short-term (one period) effect indicates.
A Survey of Existing Theory
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The resource curse literature has two main theoretical strands; following Ulfelder (2007),
we will refer to these as "demand-side" and "supply-side" explanations respectively. To clarify the implications of the resource curse thesis, we begin by reviewing the key theoretical claims. Demand-side explanations emphasize the ways in which resource revenues free governments from the need to raise revenue via domestic taxation (Beblawi 1987; Karl 1997; Mahdavy 1970; Ross 2001) . Without the need to elicit citizens' tax compliance, leaders need not accept institutional limits on their exercise of political power in exchange for revenue (cf. Bates and Lien 1985; Tilly 1992) . Without the need to collect taxes from a broad swath of the populace, leaders need not develop an efficient and disciplined bureaucracy. As a consequence, fiscal oversight is weakened. Low tax rates and the increased social spending resource revenues permits further alleviate social pressures that might otherwise provoke demands for government accountability (Dunning 2008; Morrison 2007 Morrison , 2009 Ross 2004 and Lien (1985) , North and Weingast (1989), and Tilly (1992) , among others, in thinking that democratic institutions emerge as a means by which revenue-seeking political leaders can make credible fiscal policy commitments to citizens in exchange for tax and loan revenues. A key variable in determining the parties' relative bargaining strength is the extent to which the leader depends on mobile asset holders as a source of revenues. If a large proportion of the leader's total revenue derives from citizens who are able to withhold their cooperation (by, e.g., moving their enterprise overseas or underground or off-the-books), then the leader will need to credibly commit to fiscal policies that favor these citizens in exchange for tax and loan revenues. Kingdom, and the United States exemplify this point. Prior to the discovery of huge oil reserves, these countries had already implemented hard fought institutional agreements. With these institutional arrangements in place, citizens had both the means and the opportunities required to monitor government conduct and check any attempts to dismantle these arrangements, even once resource rents became a salient source of government revenue. Hence, we expect the effect of newly exploited resources to depend on the institutional endowment present when they are first exploited. If the only way in which resource dependence influences democracy is through its propensity to prevent the emergence of democracy -as implied by extant theory -then increased resource dependence in democracies should have no effect on the survival of democracy. Of course, it is possible that increased resource dependence may actually inhibit democratic survival through causal paths we have not considered. Accordingly, we wish to directly investigate the effect of resource revenue in both autocracies and democracies. To do this, we specify below an empirical model where the effect of resource dependence is conditioned by regime type.
Research Design
Investigating our claim of interest requires operationalizing two key concepts: regime type and resource dependence. Additionally, to capture the conditionality implied by extant theory, we must model the interaction between resource dependence in period t -1 and regime type in period t -1. This section first describes our dichotomous measure of regime type and then describes our multiple measures of resource dependence.
Regime Type
For our dependent variable, we follow Al-Ubaydli (2012), Clark, Golder, and Golder (2009), and Ulfelder (2007) in using a binary indicator of regime type. 
(1) where X is a vector of control variables and Λ(•) is the logistic cumulative distribution function. Interacting each covariate (particularly our measure of resource dependence) with Democracy t-1 allows us to model what we have identified as the core idea of existing theoretical work -that the effect of resource dependence at time t -1 on regime type at time t is conditioned by regime type at t -1.
Our empirical analysis is similar to several previous studies; Al-Ubaydli (2012), Clark, Golder, and Golder (2009, ch. 6 ), Ross (2012) , and Ulfelder (2007) all use binary dependent models similar to our own, finding broadly similar results. We aim to improve upon these to more thoroughly investigate the claim that existing political institutions condition the effect of resource revenues on the likelihood of transitioning to democracy. For example, like us, AlUbaydli and Ulfelder both find that resource wealth has anti-democratic effects in autocracies.
However, by omitting democracies from their samples, these studies are unable to determine whether the effect of resource wealth differs between autocracies and democracies. Ross (2012) estimates two separate limited dependent variable models, one using an indicator of autocracyto-democracy transition and another using an indicator of democracy-to-autocracy transition.
Estimating these models separately mitigates our ability to determine whether the effect of resource dependence differs, statistically speaking, depending on prior institutional context. Clark, Golder, and Golder's (2009, ch. 6 ) model is most similar to our own. However, our use of a continuous rather than dichotomous explanatory variable better enables us to investigate how larger or smaller increases in resource dependence might affect regime type or how increases from different starting levels of dependence might matter. We also go beyond all of these studies by extensively analyzing the long-term effects of resource dependence on the likelihood of changing regime type.
Estimation Procedure
Our model specification has potentially unobserved country-specific factors and withincountry variations over time. Therefore, we do not want to simply pool together all of the country-year observations without somehow accounting for this unobserved heterogeneity. One option is fixed effects (Aslaksen 2010; Haber and Menaldo 2011). 15 However, the value of the dependent variable, Democracy i,t , does not vary for many countries in our sample. Of the 166 countries in our sample, 58 are autocracies that are never coded as democracies, while 25 are democracies that are never coded as autocracies. Half (83) of the countries in our sample would be dropped from the analysis if we used fixed effects (Chamberlain 1982; King 2001) . Hence, including fixed effects will remove many autocracies, biasing our analysis in favor of finding a "resource blessing" (cf. Haber and Menaldo 2011) . This is a severe form of selection bias, which means that the claim that resource dependence prevents transitions to democracy cannot be meaningfully assessed with a fixed effects logit.
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A random effects logit provides a straightforward alternative that still attempts to capture unobserved heterogentiy between groups, but does so without removing countries that lack variation in the dependent variable (King 2001, 501) . A random effects model assumes exogeneity between the observed covariates and the country-specific intercept, as the intercept is not included as a dummy variable but is instead subsumed into the error term (Wooldridge 2009, 489 , where time is simply the time elapsed since the last regime change (either autocracy-to-democracy or democracy-to-autocracy).
Results
The results from estimating our random effect logit model are reported in Table 1 Both indicate that, if a country is autocratic at t -1, then resource dependence at t -1 is negatively correlated with the likelihood of being a democracy at t. With respect to the effect of resource dependence when prior institutions are democratic, the coefficient on the interaction term in both models is large, positive, and significant at the 0.95 level. This indicates that having democratic institutions at t -1 alters the relationship between resource dependence at t -1 and the likelihood of being a democracy at t.
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However, given the non-linear nature of the logit model, properly identifying the marginal effect of resource dependence when countries have democratic institutions in period t requires evaluating the substantive effects via simulation.
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We use model 2 in Table 1 to compute the short-term (one period) effect of a one-time increase in Resource/GDP t-1 on the probability of being a democracy at t for two sets of countries: those with fairly low resource dependence and those with high resource dependence. Resource/GDP t-1 = 0.05, the sample mean; for highly resource dependent countries, we set
Resource/GDP t-1 = 0.25. Figure 1 presents estimates for the effect (with the 0.95 confidence bounds) associated with increasing an autocracy's level of Resource/GDP t-1 on the probability that Democracy t = 1 for 10 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent increases in the level of Resource/GDP t-1 .
All estimates are significant at the 0.05 level. To give a sense of the data supporting the estimated effect, we note the number of autocracies (and autocratic country-years) that witnessed an increase in the level of Resource/GDP t-1 that is at least as large as the increase associated with each row. To provide some intuition regarding the magnitude of these short term effects, let's consider two countries that represent differing levels of resource dependence: Egypt (low dependence, mean = 0.04) and Saudi Arabia (high resource dependence, mean = 0.35). The results show that a 10 percent increase in a country like Egypt's level of resource dependence at t -1 leads to a roughly 3 percent decrease in its probability of being democratic at t; for a country like Saudi Arabia, a 10 percent increase in resource dependence at t -1 leads to a 12 percent decrease in the probability of being democratic at t. Thus, if Egypt's baseline probability of being a democracy at t is (e.g.) 0.05, a 10 percent increase in resource dependence at t -1 reduces this probability to 0.05*(1-0.03) = 0.0485; for Saudi Arabia, a 10 percent increase in resource dependence at t -1 reduces a baseline probability of 0.05 to 0.044.
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117 autocracies (1133 autocratic country-years) witnessed an increase in resource income that is at least as large as 10 percent. Notably, 71 autocracies witnessed at least one increase in resource income dependence of at least 100 percent. This is important: for a country like Egypt, a 100 percent increase in resource dependence at t -1 leads to a 24 percent decrease in the probability of being a democracy at t, from a baseline of 0.05 to 0.038. For a highly resource dependent country like Saudi Arabia, a one-time 100 percent increase in resource dependence at t -1 leads to a 72 percent decrease in the probability of being a democracy at t, from a baseline of 0.05 to a posterior probability of 0.019. In sum, these results suggest that a large number of autocracies experienced an increase in resource dependence that induced a fairly substantial decrease in the probability of establishing democratic institutions in the following period. Figure 2 presents estimates for the effect (with the 0.95 confidence bounds) of increasing a democracy's level of Resource/GDP t-1 on the probability of being a democracy at t. To compute these, we now set Democracy t-1 = 1 and all other variables at their mean values, except Civil War t-1 is set to 0 (its median value). As above, we calculate these effects for democracies with relatively low resource dependence as well as those with high resource dependence.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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These estimates are uniformly small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, leading us to conclude that increases in resource dependence have no substantive effect on democracies' likelihood of remaining a democracy. This is consistent with a core implication of extant theory: namely, that the effect of resource dependence on future regime type is conditioned by current regime type.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Long Term Effects
The short term effects reported in Figure 1 are notable, especially for large shocks in low resource dependence autocracies and any size shocks in highly resource dependent autocracies.
But these short term effects underestimate the total effect of resource dependence on autocracies' probability of being democratic. There are two types of long term effect worth investigating: the persistent effect of a one-time increase in resource dependence several periods following the shock; and the cumulative effect of a upward structural shift in an autocracy's mean resource dependence. We investigate these in turn.
The strong persistence of governing institutions (Bates 1990; cf. Tsebelis 1990, 15) suggests that one-time increases in resource dependence can have substantial long-term consequences. Though a large increase in resource dependence may strike a country only once or twice, institutional persistence implies that this shock will continue to effect regime type for several years, decreasing an autocracy's likelihood of being a democracy beyond the next period.
If this is correct, then ignoring the long term effect of resource dependence on the likelihood of institutional change amounts to a strong assumption that institutional investments depreciate fully over the course of one period. We use the coefficients from model 2 in Table 1 to compute the long-term (multi-period) effect of a one-time increase in Resource/GDP at t on an autocracy's probability of being a democracy at t + T. If p 0 is the baseline probability of being a democracy and p 0 +δ is the probability of being a democracy one period after the increase in resource dependence, then T periods later, the estimated probability of being a democracy is given by 
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Figure 3 presents the results of this analysis for 25 and 100 percent shocks up to 10 years afterward, assuming a 0.05 baseline probability of being a democracy.
23
To provide some intuition, let's again consider the cases of Egypt (representing low resource dependent autocracies) and Saudi Arabia (representing highly resource dependent autocracies). Our results imply that a moderate (25 percent) one-time increase in Egypt's resource dependence has negligible long-term effects on its likelihood of being a democracy several years later. However, the persistent effects of larger shocks are relatively nontrivial. For example, if Egypt experiences a one-time 100 percent increase in resource dependence at t, then its probability of being a democracy at t + 5 decreases by more than 13 percent, to 0.05*(1-0.13) = 0.0435, and its probability of being a democracy at t + 10 decreases by more than 7 percent. While the persistent effect of a one-time increase in resource dependence in low dependence autocracies is nontrivial under some conditions, they are quite large in highly resource dependent autocracies like Saudi Arabia. Consider just two examples. Given a baseline probability of 0.05 of being a democracy:
a modest 25 percent shock at t implies that, all else equal, Saudi Arabia's probability of being a democracy at t + 10 decreases by more than 8 percent, to 0.05*(1-0.08) = 0.046; while a 100 percent shock at t implies that Saudi Arabia's probability of being a democracy at t + 10 decreases by more than a quarter, to 0.05*(1-0.295) = 0.035. The "resource curse" seems an apt label in light of these persistent effects on regime type several years beyond an upward shock in resource dependence. In addition to the effect of a one-time shock in resource dependence on regime type persisting several years into the future, institutional persistence also suggests that a structural increase in an autocracies' mean resource dependence can have potentially quite large cumulative effects over time. The type of scenario we have in mind is this. Suppose an autocracy's mean resource dependence has been 10 percent of GDP for many years but that, due to a long-term increase in resource prices or a new resource policy that calls for increased extraction over the long-term, its mean resource dependence increases to 12.5 percent of GDP for the foreseeable future. What effect will this structural increase in resource dependence have over the long term?
We can identify this cumulative effect by computing the quantity ∑ t=0 T β ρ t =β 1−ρ
where β is the coefficient of on lagged resource dependence and ρ is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (see De Boef and Keele 2008; Koyck 1954) . Figure 4 presents the results of this analysis for 10 and 25 percent shifts up to 10 years afterward, assuming a 0.05 baseline probability of being a democracy. 24 We can see that even small structural increases in autocracies with fairly low resource dependence have substantial cumulative effects over the long run (all else equal, of course). equal, the effect of this structural increase decreases Saudi Arabia's probability of being a democracy at t + 10 by at least 55 percent, to 0.05*(1-0.552) = 0.023. Things only get worse from there; a 25 percent structural increase in resource dependence decreases Saudi Arabia's probability of being a democracy at t + 10 by more than 85 percent, to 0.007! Clearly, structural increases in autocracies' mean resource dependence can have large cumulative effects on their probability of being a democracy.
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Conclusion
Based on existing theoretical work, we should expect resource revenues to decrease autocracies' likelihood of democratizing while leaving democracies' chances of survival untouched. A handful of previous empirical analyses have found that resource revenues decrease autocracies' likelihood of democratizing. We improve upon these previous studies by estimating a dynamic logit model that interacts a continuous measure of resource dependence with an indicator of regime type. This research design enables us to investigate, in a unified and nuanced way, the effects of resource revenue on regime type in both autocracies and democracies. We also extend previous analyses by estimating not only the one-period effect of resource revenue, but the multi-period (long term) effect as well. We show that the persistent and cumulative effects of resource dependence are quite substantial over several periods. Thus, the short term effects typically reported by previous studies underestimate the total effect of resource dependence on regime type. Our results are consistent with the implications of much extant theory: resource dependence reduces autocracies' short term probability of transitioning to democracy and this translates into substantial long-term negative effects. In contrast, resource dependence has no effect on democracies' likelihood of remaining democratic. Put simply, the resource curse is a story about autocratic persistence, not the origins of autocracy. Future work must seek out data that more directly capture our theoretical quantities of interests -namely, the extent of institutional constraints on leaders' fiscal discretion and leaders' fiscal reliance on income derived from resource extraction. Our findings leave us 21 optimistic that studies using such data will cohere with our main conclusion: that the resource curse strikes countries that lack institutional mechanisms limiting political leaders' fiscal discretion prior to the onset of resource dependence, but passes over countries where such institutions are in place before the resource revenue begins to flow. 
